(Source: TI SOURCE BOOK 2000 - Chapter 2)

The Institutional Pillars of the National Integrity System

(Explained below under ' The National Integrity System")

Understanding Corruption

Bureaucracies are designed to perform public business. But as soon as a bureaucracy is established, it develops an autonomous spiritual life and comes to regard the public as the enemy. [Brooks Atkinson, "September 9", Once Around the Sun - 1951]

While corruption is defined as "the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit", it can also be described as representing non-compliance with the "arm's-length" principle under which no personal or family relationship should play any role in economic decision-making, be it by private economic agents or by government officials.

Once the arm's-length principle has been breached and a distinction made based on relationships, corruption will often follow. Conflict of interest situations and nepotism are examples. The arm's-length principle is seen as fundamental to the efficient functioning of any organisation.

A core, but unstated, assumption underlying theoretical work on the role of the public sector is that public sector officials (both policy-makers and civil servants) are knowledgeable, neutral and impersonal in their pursuit of the social welfare. But are they? What do officials see as the pursuit of the social welfare and what do they, themselves, consider to be "corruption"? And what of their willingness - or otherwise - to take action against it? These questions are all too seldom asked.

In 1994, a major research project in New South Wales, Australia, by the state's Independent Commission Against Corruption, sought to determine the kinds of conduct public sector employees would judge as corrupt and identify those factors which might hinder employees from taking action against it. A survey was conducted in which public servant respondents were asked to assess twelve scenarios in terms of the desirability of the behaviour, how harmful it was, how justified they considered it to be, and what they would do about it.

In addition, respondents were asked to state whether, and how strongly, they agreed or disagreed with the twelve attitude statements. Individual respondents differed sharply in their views as to what was -or was not - "corrupt". As the report notes, "it is important for all who are interested in minimising corruption to realise that what any one public sector employee understands as "corrupt" may not be shared by his or her colleagues". This lack of commonality of understanding adds to the difficulty of combating corruption.

The survey showed that a willingness to take action would depend on a number of factors, including the relationship between taking action and how harmful, undesirable or unjustified each scenario was considered to be. Factors which reduced the willingness to take action included the belief that the behaviour was justified in the circumstances; the attitude that reporting corruption was futile, as nothing useful would be done about it; the belief that the behaviour was not corrupt; a fear of both personal and professional retaliation; the low relative position within the organisation; employees' perception of their relationships with the perpetrator and the supervisor; and concerns about insufficient evidence.

Clearly, therefore, the starting point for any serious work on containing corruption has to be the personal perspectives of those in positions of trust or authority. As the Australian study demonstrated, this must begin by raising awareness of what constitutes the threshold of acceptable behaviour and the creation of a more informed understanding of the costs of corruption.

A very different survey of the experience of Transparency International chapters, in 1995, suggested that corruption in the public sector takes much the same form and affects the same areas whether one is dealing with a developed country or a developing one. The areas of government activity most vulnerable to corruption were: public procurement; rezoning of land; revenue collection; government appointments; and local government.

The methodologies, too, were remarkably similar, including: cronyism, connections, family members and relatives; political corruption through donations to political campaigns, etc.; kickbacks on government contracts (and subcontracting consultancies); and fraud of all kinds.

Within the public service (including politicians, as well as elected and appointed officials), the following kinds of activities often take place: Ministers "sell" their discretionary powers. For example, in New South Wales, Australia, the Minister for Corrective Services was convicted and jailed for selling early releases from prison to drug traffickers; officials take percentages on government contracts, which are often paid into foreign bank accounts; officials receive excessive "hospitality" from government contractors and benefits in kind, such as scholarships for the education of children at foreign universities; officials contract government business to themselves, either through front companies and "partners" or even openly to themselves as "consultants"; officials deliberately travel abroad so that they can claim per diem allowances which they set themselves at extravagant levels; political parties use the prospect of power, or of its continuation, to levy large rents on international businesses in particular, in return for government contracts (which may be dressed up as a "donation" to a designated "charity" or a "hospital"). For example, in Kenya during the Kenyatta years, the vehicle was the Gatundu Armed Forces Hospital, which was the enforced "beneficiary" of "charitable donations" by all who wished to do business with the regime. Had this hospital really been the ultimate destination for the money, it could have been a major teaching hospital, instead of being a comparatively modest hospital in the former President's tribal area; revenue officials practice extortion by threatening to surcharge tax payers or importers unless bribes are paid, in which case unjustifiably low assessments are made, or goods are passed for importation without payment of any duty at all. For example, revenue collection in Tanzania slumped dramatically in 1994-95. In Italy, where the practice is also said to be widespread, taxpayers, particularly large companies, accuse the 'financial police' of extorting money from them, although the degree of their unwillingness to pay for illicit reductions in their tax bills remains to be tested in criminal prosecutions; law enforcement officials extort money for their own benefit by threatening to impose traffic penalties unless bribes are paid (which are frequently somewhat less than the penalty the offence would attract if it went to court); providers of pubic services (e.g., drivers' licenses, market stall permits, passport control) insist on payments for the services in order to speed up the process or to prevent delays. In Latin America, this practice has become so institutionalised that a whole profession has grown up to "assist" those who wish to transact business with a government department; superiors in the public service charge "rents" from their subordinates, requiring them to raise set sums each week or month and to pass these on upwards. In Mexico City, a practice developed whereby a policeman on street duty would be charged rents on his patrol car, his gun and his job, with separate rents going to the different officers responsible for transport, firearms and supervision; and, "ghosts" are created to pad payrolls and lists of pensioners, or to create fictitious institutions which, if they existed, would be entitled to state funds. In Uganda complete "ghost schools" were identified in a surprise audit undertaken in the context of a public sector reform project. The Warioba Commission found many instances of this in neighbouring Tanzania. Even France has not been immune. An army paymaster was found to have created fictitious units within the French Army in order to generate private payments.

Corruption, in all its forms, is not unique to any one country. Corruption in China, where bureaucrats have "commercialised their administrative power", is really no different from that in Europe, where political parties have taken huge kickbacks for public works projects. (In Italy, the cost of road construction has reportedly dropped by more than twenty percent since the "Clean Hands" assault on corruption.) Slush funds have been established in Swiss bank accounts for illicit political party financing and suspicions are that these funds have been "leaked" into private pockets. Kickbacks, too, have been paid to political parties for defence procurement. Companies have wined, dined, entertained and bribed officials, especially across international borders, to obtain business illegally and unfairly and, not infrequently, with disastrous consequences.

In Britain, conflict of interest scandals implicated Members of Parliament to the point where public faith in government ministers being "generally trusted to tell the truth" was ranked at a mere 11percent (with both doctors and teachers rating 84 percent, and television news-readers 72 percent). While most occupational groups had improved their standing over the previous ten year period, the standing of Ministers and politicians generally, already very low, fell even further. Press reaction suggests that public cynicism in Britain has, if anything, grown substantially since 1993, when the poll was taken. British politicians have generally fallen from misjudgement rather than criminal deeds;however, in continental Europe, including Belgium, Italy, Austria, France and Spain, political figures are being actively investigated and prosecuted for criminal breaches of trust. At any given time, numerous political figures are under investigation in the United States. In Australia, ministers have been jailed, and in New Zealand, an Auditor-General, while in office, was alleged to have misappropriated public funds and was imprisoned. Nevertheless, in a 1995 TI poll, New Zealand still was rated as the least corrupt of the 41 countries included in opinion surveys of business people doing business internationally.

One lesson is clear: very few are in any position to criticise anyone else on the issue of corruption. Even in Singapore, arguably one of the countries with the least corrupt government, corruption exists, albeit to a very small degree. Hence, the second lesson: corruption affects even the cleanest governments and must be guarded against constantly.

Types of bribery
There is widespread agreement on the situations that are especially amenable to corruption. However, an effective effort to deal with corruption must begin with its root causes. We need to understand the incentives for potential bribers and those injured by the corruption of others. Four broad categories can be distinguished:

Category (1): Bribes may be paid for (a) access to a scarce benefit, or (b) avoidance of a cost.

Category (2): Bribes can be paid for receipt of a benefit (or avoidance of a cost) that is not scarce, but where discretion must be exercised by state officials.

Category (3): Bribes can be paid, not for a specific public benefit itself but for services connected with obtaining a benefit (or avoiding a cost), such as speedy service or inside information.

Category (4): Bribes can be paid (a) to prevent others from sharing in a benefit or (b) to impose a cost on someone else.

Category (1) includes any bureaucratic decision where the briber's gain is someone else's loss: for example, access to import or export permits;foreign exchange; a government contract or franchise; concessions to develop oil or other minerals; public land allocation; the purchase of a newly privatised firm; access to scarce capital funds under state control; a license to operate a business when the total number of licenses is fixed; access to public services such as public housing; subsidised inputs; or heightened police protection for a business. In all these examples, there may be competition between bribers which can be manipulated or even created by bureaucrats or politicians. If public servants have the discretion to design programmes, they may be able to create scarcity for their own pecuniary benefit or over-allocate resources (a phenomenon known as 'supply stretching').

Examples of Category (2) include: reducing tax bills or extorting higherpayments when no fixed revenue constraint exists; waiving of customs dutiesand regulations; avoidance of price controls; awarding a license or permitonly to those who are deemed to "qualify"; access to open-ended public services (entitlements); receipt of a civil service job; exemption from enforcement of the law (especially for victimless and white collar crime); board approval for a building project; and lax enforcement of safety or environmental standards. Bureaucratic discretion can often lead to the extortion of bribes. Police can pay gangs to threaten businesses, while at the same time accepting bribes from these same businesses for their protection. Similarly, politicians can threaten to support laws that will impose costs or promise to provide specialised benefits in return for payoffs.

Category (3) are services related to the first two categories, rather than a benefit per se. For example, inside information on contract specifications(as was the case in Singapore, where a consortium of corporations from exporting countries bribed to obtain privileged information in connection with government contracts - the corporations were subsequently blacklisted by the Government of Singapore). Other aspects include faster service; reduced paperwork; advance notice of police raids; reduced uncertainty; or a favourable audit report that would keep taxes low. Bureaucrats can often generate the conditions that produce such bribes. Officials can introduce delays and impose rigid application requirements. For example, despite tough environmental protection laws in Russia, the condition of the environment suggests that the legal regime is focused more on providing opportunities for officials to extract bribes for non-compliance than on actually protecting the environment.

Category (4), like (1), also includes winners and losers. Examples include cases where one operator of an illegal business might pay law enforcement agencies to raid his competitors. Owners of legal businesses might seek the imposition of excessive regulatory constraints on competitors, or attempt to induce officials to refuse to license a potential competitor. A Queensland Police Commissioner was bribed by illegal gaming interests to furnish a report to his government arguing strongly that the gaming industry should not be legalised.

In Categories (1) and (4), where there are direct losers, the organisation of the potential bribers may be important in determining the size and prevalence of corruption. If there is only a small number of potential beneficiaries, they may simply share the market monopolistically among themselves, rather than resort to bribery, and then present a united front to public officials. These cases demonstrate that the elimination of corruption is not an end in itself. A policy encouraging the monopolisation of an industry could reduce corruption but would have few social gains. Instead of flowing in part to public officials, the benefits would flow into the pockets of monopolistic firms. In addition, if these companies are foreign-owned and repatriating profits, or international criminal concerns, the benefits will mostly flow out of the country. Examples like these illustrate how the problem might not be corruption per se but the monopoly rents that give rise to payoffs.

The extraction of payments from people who are entitled to services but unable to get them (e.g. for the issuing of a driver's licence) is properly classified as "extortion" (and a crime in most countries) rather than a bribe. The test would be whether both payer and recipient were acting illegally, or whether the payer was an innocent victim of an offence by an official who would otherwise deny the payer his lawful entitlement.

Corruption and market inefficiency
Some commentators argue that bribery simply represents the operation of market forces within state programmes, and that, given the inefficiency of the market, payoffs should be tolerated. Such cases might exist; however, this benign assessment must be treated with scepticism.

First, public programmes may be undermined when public servants allocate scarce resources to the highest bidder. Public housing, for instance, is designed for the poorest families, not those who can pay the most. In addition, the prospect of payoffs can lead officials to create artificial scarcity and red tape. Moreover, where bribes are paid to induce public officials to favour a firm at the expense of competitors, the highest bidder is often not the most efficient organisation in the marketplace; instead, it can be the organisation with the highest monopoly profits resulting from the elimination of competitors.

The illegality of corruption itself introduces costs that will limit the efficiency of bribery. First, because its perpetrators try to keep their illicit dealings secret, the price information that is essential for a well-operating market is not easily available, and may result in price inflexibility. Once an acceptable bribe rate (10% of the contract price) orfee (US$100 to get a driving license) has been set and is known in the relevant community, the price may remain constant, even in the face of changing market conditions over time. Corruption markets may be more influenced by habit and tradition than ordinary private markets. Large shocks may be needed, such as the fall of a corrupt government, to re-adjust bribe payments.

Second, to reduce the risk of detection, entry into the bribery market for both payers and receivers is limited to people who are known and trusted - relatives, close friends, members of the village or tribe.

Third, the benefits of corruption are not widely distributed if some refuse to participate. Honest public servants may simply refuse to enter the corrupt marketplace.

Fourth, given the illegality of bribes, contracts between beneficiaries and public officials cannot be enforced. Thus, the risk that one side or the other will not perform, will limit the number and type of deals and make it more likely that such transactions will only occur among people who are well known to one another. As a general rule, then, one can reject the claim that corruption allocates resources efficiently.

Transitions to democracy and to a market economy
Corruption thrives in rigid systems with multiple bottlenecks and sources of monopoly power within government. A planned economy, where many prices are below market-clearing levels, provides incentives for payoffs as a way to allocate scarce goods and services. Transactions that would be legal trades in market economies are illegal payoffs in such systems. In addition to selling goods and services to the highest bribe bidders, public servants have incentives to create even more bottlenecks as a way of extracting higher payoffs. Officials might, for example, create delays or introduce costly conditions. The fundamental problem is not simply the existence of controlled prices set below the market-clearing level, but also the monopoly power of state officials who are not threatened with entry by more efficient and lower-priced competitors.

Throughout the former Soviet bloc, the state of the economy gave officials an incentive to exploit their positions for private gain and gave their customers and clients an incentive to make payoffs. Corruption was common because the formal rigidity of the system was not backed up by an impartial, legal system capable of enforcing the rules. Instead, ultimate authority was exercised by superiors in the hierarchy who often had their own reasons for bending or changing the rules on their own authority. Subordinates could not appeal to "the law" as a reason for resisting the demands of their superiors. The system was not only rigid, but also arbitrary. Its requirements and irrationalities turned almost everyone into a law breaker.The widespread complicity of the citizenry in corrupt transactions, became a method of social control. Corruption cases were often used to punish dissidents, not to improve the functioning of the state bureaucracy.

It should be noted, however that the situation differed from one Eastern country to another. There were complaint mechanisms, both communal and state, as well as mechanisms in trade unions, and certainly in some countries these worked reasonably well, at least when political questions were not involved. Omnipresent state security also covered economic matters and had a deterrent effect. However, one widely prevailing view is to the effect that "the State was stealing from us, and we were taking our own property back again".

These observations might suggest that the decline of authoritarian governments and centrally planned economies will reduce the incidence of corruption as competitive market forces come to the fore. According to this scenario, illegal payoffs will be converted into legal market prices, and the level of monopoly rents will fall. But such has not been the case. Corruption and lawlessness has been rampant in the emerging market economies of Russia and Eastern Europe and in the new democracies of Latin America.

Stories of America's 1920 robber barons are invoked to argue that "cowboy capitalism" is just a transitional stage that must be endured on the way to a more stable capitalist stage. The danger, however, is that corruption can become so widespread that it can undermine and destroy the transitional stage itself. Even if corruption is consistent with economic growth under some conditions, this does not imply that it facilitates growth or that it does not have other negative political and social consequences. Moreover, the links between corrupt business and organised crime, and the cross-border arrangements they have made, add entirely new dimensions to the problem and are further reasons to suspect that history is not simply repeating itself.

During the transitional period, if prices are permitted to reach market-clearing levels, no one need pay a bribe to get supplies. If, however, pockets of state control remain, they may become the loci of payoffs. Thus, the privatisation process itself, although ultimately reducing corruption by lowering state involvement in the economy, may initially be a source of corrupt activities as investors jockey for position.

The basic source of corruption is no longer the rigidity of the system, but the uncertainty surrounding it. The transitional stage lacks both legal legitimacy and institutional strength as a result of fragile and poorly developed administrative and political structures. People operating within these transitional state structures seek certainty, and they may try to achieve it by paying off officials. In the worst case, citizens and business people simply opt out of the legal economy and rely on organised crime to provide protection both from the state and any competitive threat.

Corruption may then be merely a device for inducing public officials to look the other way. The state becomes not just weak, but irrelevant as well. The end result of the destructive cycle could be public pressure to limit the role of the market and return the state to a planned economy.

If stability facilitated corruption in the past and instability encourages it in the present, what is to be done? In spite of the dramatic changes in institutional structure that have occurred in transitional societies, an important obstacle remains: the lack of a credible state commitment to the Rule of Law. The response of transitional states to corruption must be both substantive law reform and institutional restructuring. Countries in transition should liberalise their economies by reducing incentives for bribery and eliminating subsidies, trade restrictions, and preferential treatment in government purchasing.

Nevertheless, as transitional states deregulate and decontrol in some areas, they will need to introduce regulations in others. For instance, they may need new laws regulating environmental pollution, worker and consumer health and safety, and financial and securities markets. They may also need new subsidy programmes for needy people unable to survive in a market economy.These new programmes, however, should be designed to keep corruption incentives low. Thus, pollution might be regulated through tradable emissions permits and welfare provided through direct cash payments or voucher systems. Yet, even these programmes can be open to abuse.Simplification and market-based schemes cannot solve all problems; structural and moral reforms must also be part of the solution.

The National Integrity System
(Chapter 4 of TI Source Book 2000)

The structure has been erected by architects of consummate skill and fidelity; its foundations are solid; its compartments are beautiful as well as useful; its arrangements are full of wisdom and order; and its defenses are impregnable from without. It has been reared for immortality if the work of man may justly aspire to such a title. It may, nevertheless, perish in an hour by the folly, or corruption or negligence of its only keepers--the people. Republics are created--by the virtue, public spirit, and intelligence of the citizens. They fall, when the wise are banished from public councils, because they dare to be honest and the profligate are rewarded, because they flatter the people, in order to betray them - Dr. Sachidanand Siha while presiding at the inaugural session of India's Constituent Assembly, 9 December 1946.

The case for reform
Corruption undermines democratic development, inhibiting the performance ofpublic institutions and the optimal use of resources. It feeds secrecy andsuppression. Ultimately, it denies development and an increased quality oflife to the most vulnerable members of society. While corruption might, atleast in theory, be tamed in an autocratic and dictatorial manner using a"big stick", the inexorable decline into corruption and otherabuses of power on the part of totalitarian administrations suggests thatthis can only be temporary. The promotion of national integrity across theboard is crucial to any process of sustainable reform. By raising levels ofnational integrity, corruption can be reduced; and this approach is vital ifother efforts to promote sustainable and equitable development are not to beundermined.

Consequences of corruption
As is well-known, corruption engenders wrong choices. It encourages competition in bribery, rather than competition in quality and in the price of goods and services. It inhibits the development of a healthy marketplace.Above all, it distorts economic and social development, particularlydamaging in developing countries. Too often, corruption means that theworld's poorest, who are least able to bear the costs, must pay not only forthe corruption of their own officials, but also for that of companies fromdeveloped countries. Moreover, evidence shows that if corruption is notcontained, it will grow, and grow exponentially. Once a pattern ofsuccessful bribes is institutionalised, corrupt officials have an incentiveto demand larger bribes, engendering a "culture" of illegalitythat in turn breeds market inefficiency. Once the moral authority ofmanagers is lost, through corruption at higher levels, their ability tocontrol their subordinates evaporates.

At the conceptual level, there are many costs associated with corruption.However, it is hardly surprising that there is little hard evidence on the incidence and magnitude of corruption. Surveys of business people indicate that the problem varies widely across countries and that even within countries, some public agencies (for example, customs and tax collection)are more prone to corruption than others. Surveys also indicate that, wherecorruption is endemic, it imposes a disproportionately high cost on smallbusinesses. Most importantly, the heaviest cost is typically not so much inthe bribes themselves, but rather in the underlying economic distortionsthey trigger and in the undermining of institutions of administration andgovernance.

The argument is not simply a "moral" or "cultural" one."Grand corruption" needs to be contained for practical reasons [1]. Faced with the challenge of maintaining or improving standards of living, no country can afford the inefficiency that accompanies corruption. Emerging democracies, in particular, brave considerable political risks if corruption is not contained, as the corrupt can greatly weaken the authority and capacity of the fledgling state.

[1] (the huge bribes and commissions offered or paid by businesses inindustrialised countries in their quest for government orders in the developing world and countries of central and eastern Europe), 

Curiously, there are still those in the North who believe that bribes speed up the delivery of services from a corrupt administration and who argue that corruption can help grease the wheels of a slow-moving and over-regulated economy. Surveys in Tanzania reveal the opposite: once a person hasidentified himself as being willing to pay bribes, other gatekeepers appearto be alerted, so that the person is delayed and subjected to additionalforms of extortion as he or she proceeds. By way of contrast, those whorefuse to pay at the first "gate" are earmarked as nonpayers andtherefore not worth the time and energy for others to try to exploit .Evidence also indicates that corruption increases the costs of goods andservices, promotes unproductive investments, and leads to a decline in thequality of infrastructure services.

Corruption reports unfold in the news media on a daily basis and demonstratecorruption is not exclusively, or even primarily, a problem of developingcountries. Recent events in Europe and North America have shown all tooclearly that corruption is a topic on which the developed countries have nocause to claim the moral high ground. Developed countries play a major roleas "bribe givers" in international business transactions, and theyexperience domestic corruption, particularly political corruption, as agrowing phenomenon.

The response to the challenge
Initiatives to improve standards of governance worldwide have until recently overlooked what promises to be the most significant approach of all: thesystematic and conscious fashioning of a country's "National IntegritySystem". Even the expression is of recent origin, having emerged fromdiscussions within the Transparency International movement and widelypopularised by development agencies.

While the basic concepts and foundations of an integrity system need to beclearly understood, it is equally important that the resulting solutions begrounded in reality and practicality. More than this, the solutions mustrelate to the other parts of the overall system; hence the need for anholistic approach. Many anti-corruption strategies have failed because theyhave been too narrowly focused. There are no simple solutions.

But what is a "National Integrity System"?
It is generally accepted today that modern government requiresaccountability. Without it, no system can function in a way which promotesthe public interest rather than the private interests of those in control.

Basically, the task in developing countries and countries in transition, is to move away from a system which is essentially top down: one in which anautocratic ruling elite gives orders which are followed, to a greater orlesser degree, by those down the line. The approach is to move instead to asystem of "horizontal accountability"; one in which power isdispersed, where none has a monopoly, and where each is separatelyaccountable.

In such a system, there must be a free press. But the press must respect certain limits imposed by law - for example, avoiding defamatory attacks onindividuals. For even a free press is accountable, not only perhaps to a Press Council (which may or may not be a statutory body) but also, andultimately, to the courts. For their part, the courts are no longer'servants' of the ruling elite, but rather act with independence and enforcethe Rule of Law, and the rule under the law. Yet such independence is notabsolute--Judges are answerable for their individual decisions through asystem of appeals, and each Judge is accountable for his or her integrityand competence to another body, be it a parliament or a judicial servicescommission. That body, in turn, is accountable elsewhere, and ultimately tothe people through the ballot box. So do the strands of accountability linkthe various elements, or "pillars", and in such linking they braceand strengthen each other.

Under a system of "horizontal accountability"[2] a "virtuous circle" is perfected: one in which each actor is botha watcher and is watched, is both a monitor and is monitored. A circleavoids, and at the same time answers the age-old question: "Who shallguard the guards?".

But creating a "virtuous circle" is easier said than done. Age-old traditions and training have to be turned on their heads, and the process isobviously one which is likely to take a generation, if not generations, toperfect. Even then, ultimate perfection will always be elusive.

While the contemporary wave of democracy has held much promise, in practice, democratic gains are being threatened and undermined by some of the veryphenomena that were intended as democracy's victims: corruption, abuse of power and nepotism. Simply to democratise is to introduce a different form of vertical accountability--downwards, rather than upwards. But the need to refashion instrumentalities of governance runs very much deeper than simply moving from a totalitarian system to one in which the people periodically have a voice.

The shift is thus from a system of vertical responsibility--be it the tyrant or the leadership of the one party state--to one of horizontal accountability, whereby a system of agencies of restraint and watch-dogs are designed to check abuses of power by other agencies and branches of government. These include: the courts, independent electoral tribunals, auditors-general, central banks, professional organisations, Parliaments(and Public Accounts Commit-tees), and a free and independent media.

However, the passage of transition is slow and painful. In some societies it has been a question of rehabilitating what was once there before; in others, notably in Eastern Europe, it can be a question of constructing the modern state literally from the ground upwards. There are no institutional memories of times of horizontal accountability, no living memories of how things once were, and could be again.

Such accountability mechanisms, when designed as part of a national effort to reduce corruption, comprise an Integrity System. This system of checks and balances is designed to achieve accountability between the various arms and agencies of government. The system manages conflicts of interest in the public sector, effectively disperses power and limits situations in which conflicts of interest arise or have a negative impact on the common good. This involves accountability, transparency, prevention and penalty.
An integrity system embodies a comprehensive view of reform, addressing corruption in the public sector through government processes (leadership codes, organisational change, legal reforms, procedural reforms in bureaucracies etc.) and through civil reforms. Even if corruption is endemic, it tends to be the result of systemic failures. The primary emphasis is on reforming and changing systems, rather than on blaming individuals.

Some readers of earlier versions of this Source Book have suggested that it adopts an old-fashioned, "top-down" approach to reform which is out of keeping with contemporary thinking. However, this misses the crucial point. As appears below, the whole edifice of government is sustained and its integrity maintained (or undermined) by a bottom-up process. As is often observed, 'the fish may rot from the head', and corruption may filter down through poor leadership examples and practices but, it is public awareness and, where warranted, public outrage, that is a society's ultimate defence. Where all else fails, the final sanction is revolution. However, the assumption underlying the approach advanced here, is that evolution, not revolution, can be an effective and a preferable route to society participation--through democratic processes and involving the private sector, media, professions, churches and mosques, as well as NGO's. Thus, reform is initiated and sustained not only by politicians and policy makers, but also by members of civil society.

Reform programmes, particularly those in developing countries and countries in transition which have been supported by international or donor agencies,have tended to focus on a single area to the exclusion of others. These are"single pillar" strategies. Frequently the choice has been made of a "pillar" that is relatively "safe", at the expense of addressing more difficult and more challenging areas. Certainly, a"National Integrity System" reform programme can accommodate a piecemeal approach, but this must be coordinated and within the bounds of an holistic programme which embraces each one of the relevant areas, and theirinter-relationships with others.

Underpinning the integrity system approach is the conviction that all of the issues of contemporary concern in the area of governance--capacity development, results orientation, public participation, and the promotion of national integrity--need to be addressed in a holistic fashion. The overall goals should include:

*Public services that are both efficient and effective, and which contribute to sustainable development;

*Government functioning under law, with citizens protected from arbitrariness (including abuses of human rights); and

*Development strategies which yield benefits to the nation as a whole, including its poorest and most vulnerable members, and not just to well-placed elites.

Building a coherent National Integrity System - The Goal
The ultimate goal of establishing a National Integrity System is to make corruption a "high risk" and "low return" undertaking. As such, the system is designed to prevent corruption from occurring in the first place, rather than relying on penalties after the event.

Every country already has a "National Integrity System" of some description in place, however corrupted and however ineffective it may be. The concept helps to focus reformers on the holistic viewpoint. As we shall see, it is not enough to address a single element or "pillar" of the system in isolation to others. For instance, recently considerable work in Kenya has strengthened the operational capabilities of the Office of the Auditor-General. However, although widely featured in the media, theAuditor-General's highly-professional reports have since been simply ignored, as the rest of the "system" is still effectively dysfunctional.

The Institutional Pillars of the National Integrity System [See diagram above]
Picture, if you will, a "National Integrity System" as being rather like a Greek temple: a temple with a roof - the nation's integrity,supported at either end by a series of pillars, each being an individual element of the National Integrity System. At one end of the temple are the institutional pillars - the Judiciary, the Parliament, the Auditor-General'sOffice, the Ombudsman, free media, civil society and the like. At the other end of the temple, the pillars represent the core tools which the institutions must have at their disposal to be effective. For example, the media must have a right of freedom of speech; and civil society the legal space in which to organise itself and conduct its business.

Resting on the roof are three round balls: "Quality of Llife","Rule of Law" and "Sustainable Development". They are round balls to emphasise that it is crucial that the roof be kept level if these three round balls and the values they encompass are not to roll off.

The "temple" itself is built on and sustained by foundations which comprise Public Awareness and Society's values. If public awareness is high and values are strong, both will support the "pillars" which rest on them, giving them added strength. On the other hand, if the public is apathetic and not watchful, or if the values are widely lacking, then the foundations will be weak. The "pillars" will be empty and ineffectual, and lack the underpinning necessary if they are to safeguard the nation's integrity.
The "pillars" are interdependent but may be of differing strengths. If one pillar weakens, an increased load is thrown onto one or more of the others. If several pillars weaken, their load will ultimately tilt, so that the "round balls" of "sustainable development", "Rule of Law" and "Quality of Life" will roll off, crash to the ground and the whole edifice collapse into chaos.

The actual "pillars" may and will vary from society to society. Some will be stronger; some will be weaker. But there will always bet rade-offs to accommodate this. For instance, in Singapore, a comparativel ack of press freedom is compensated for by an intrusive anti-corruption bureau.
While there are variations around the world, the most usual "integrity pillars"[3] of a society which is seeking to govern itself in an accountable fashion include:

Executive;
Parliament;
Judiciary;
Civil service;
"watchdog" Agencies (Public Accounts Committee, Auditor-General, Ombudsman, Police, Anti-Corruption Agency, etc.);
Civil Society (including the professions and the private sector);
Mass Media;
International Agencies.

The "Rules and Practices" Pillars
Complementing each of the National Integrity System institutional "pillars" are Core "Rules and Practices". These rules and practices comprise the "toolkit" employed by, or underpinning, the various institutions. The absence of core rules and practices are clear indicators of weakness.They are not necessarily confined to any single particular pillar, as the following illustrates:

Institutional pillar: Corresponding core rules/practices
Executive: Conflict of interest rules
Legislature/Parliament: Fair elections
Public Accounts Committee (of legislature): Power to question senior officials
Auditor General: Public reporting
Public Service: Public Service ethics
Judiciary: Independence
Media: Access to information
Civil society: Freedom of speech
Ombudsman: Records management
Anti-corruption [4] / watchdog agencies: Enforceable and enforced laws
Private sector: Competition policy, including public procurement rules
International community: Effective mutual legal/judicial assistance

The rules and practices are not, of course, exclusive to the institutional pillar to which they are assigned above. The media must have freedom of expression, but this has been assigned, somewhat pragmatically, to civil society, as it is also a core requirement for civil society. Records are crucial for an Ombudsman, but are also at the heart of accountability and so of prime concern to the watchdog agencies. Some indicators that are also important are subsumed in others in this list: e.g. whistle blower and complaints mechanisms may be regarded as being covered by freedom of speech and public service ethics.

In their totality, the Institutional Pillars in the left-hand column together with the Rules and Practices in the right-hand column comprise a basic National Integrity System.

Establishing a sound National Integrity System requires the systematic identification of gaps and weaknesses, as well as opportunities for strengthening or augmenting each of these pillars into a coherent framework. If the system is wholly dependent on a single "pillar" such as, perhaps, a "benign dictator", or only a very few of them, it will be vulnerable to collapse. The system may give the outward appearance of functioning in the short term, for instance in the case of clean-ups conducted by military governments on the overthrow of corrupt civilian regimes, such as that under way in Pakistan. However, the lack of a functioning integrity system ensures progressive decay, unless there is alsoa timely move toward accountable governance.

The National Integrity System approach unlocks a new form of diagnosis and potential cure for corruption. Instead of looking at separate institutions(e.g. the Judiciary) or separate rules and practices (e.g. the criminal law) and then focusing on stand-alone reform programmes, we start to look at inter-relationships, inter-dependence and combined effectiveness in an holistic approach. For example, what is the benefit of a sound and "clean" Judiciary ready to uphold the Rule of Law, if there is corruption in the police, investigators, prosecutors or the legal profession? The Judges would simply not receive the cases they should hear; they would then sit in splendid isolation - honest, capable, yet able to achieve little.

The National Integrity Workshop
One of the best mechanisms by which a National Integrity System can be systematically examined and overhauled is through the National Integrity Workshop. This has the overwhelming advantage of bringing together the various stakeholders - officials and interest groups that may otherwise seldom, if ever, meet - and providing a broad ownership of the process, an essential for success.

It must be stressed that this approach was not formulated in western capitals or by donor agencies. It emerged as groups in Uganda and Tanzania began to address their domestic problems, and was the product of interaction within and between both countries.

A National Integrity Workshop takes as its starting points: the premise that people living in a country know and understand their problems far better than any outside expert. No outsider can better understand the social dynamics, the history and the political realities that underlie the incidence of corruption in a society, than can its own members. And the expression "members" embraces civil society (including the private sector), no less than government; that the issue of integrity transcends the divides of political parties and so should be something upon which all can agree;
that without the active participation of leaders from all fields of government and civil society, meaningful reforms are unlikely to be achieved; and that without the support of civil society, any anti-corruption reform initiative by a government is likely to lack credibility and be unlikely to succeed, let alone be sustainable in the longer term.

The exercise therefore is wholly conceptualised, driven and owned by the local participants. Contributions from outsiders take just two forms: facilitation of the process, as outlined below, and learning themselves so that experience gained can be disseminated for the benefit of similar exercises in other countries. It also involves not just the"stakeholders" from within government as identified from the integrity "pillars", but also non-governmental organisations, including business groups and professions, the media and political parties from across the political spectrum.

The general pattern has been for a group to be assembled, bringing together people with deci-sion-making powers, and with each of the"pillars" having written a short paper on how corruption presents their particular institution with a challenge, and how they are responding to it. The workshops are further informed both by reports of similar workshops held in other countries (useful for ideas and approaches) and by this Source Book (in some cases translated into a local language). To sharpen the discussions, the facilitators, together with the organisers, formulate a short series of challenging, clearly-focused questions for smallgroups to consider, along with any additional questions which the participants themselves may suggest.
So it is that, over a period of two or three days, a series of small group discussions take place (maximum 15 people per group), serviced by a facilitator who captures the essence of the discussion. The tasks of each group are to diagnose a particular problem and to prescribe practical solutions that are within the competence of those at the table, for example not calling for across-the-board pay raises for all public servants or for changes to the constitution etc.

Each topic is dealt with in a reporting back session, followed by a shortplenary discussion. From the totality of the reporting back and a final "action planning" session, an "action plan" emerges. Practical measures are identified, responsibilities for follow-up action assigned to people who are present and a time-table for action agreed upon.This, then, forms the basis for a follow-up workshop in perhaps 12 to 18 months' time, to assess progress, identify obstacles and to refine the action plan in the light of experience and of changing circumstances.

A further feature of national integrity workshops has been the emergence of "integrity pledges" to which all present subscribe. The first, inTanzania, constituted a challenge to the candidates for the presidency to commit themselves publicly, and in advance, to programmes of reform and to declare their personal assets and those of their spouses publicly upon election. Benjamin Mkapa, in 1995 newly elected as President, subscribed to the pledge and has lived up to it. When he disclosed his assets, it created a tidal wave of interest not only within Tanzania, but throughout sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. Since then, pledges have been widely used, most conspicuously in Papua New Guinea, where in a recent election, various political parties signed pledges live on television. Pledges have served both to place the issue of integrity squarely on the political map and to provide critics with a weapon against those perceived as having breached the pledges. The pledges in Papua New Guinea, for example, are referred to in parliamentary debates.[5]

None of this is to suggest that the process of reform is an easy one, or that quick and sustainable results are immediately achievable. Each society has to own its reforms and be committed to them. There is little evidence to suggest that, in the area of promoting integrity, external actors, whether individual governments or multilateral agencies, can force the pace of sustainable change in any given country. However, outside pressures may be helpful in encouraging an internal debate and building coalitions for reform within a country. For instance, conditions attached to loans by international financial institutions may force the release of information which has previously been kept secret by corrupt government administrations.The withholding of loans by financial institutions to administrations which are likely to misappropriate them, is also helpful as well as sensible.[6]While these external actions are useful in promoting integrity, the essential dynamic must be an internal one.

Similarly, the role of outside "experts" is the limited one of facilitator. They can inform and provide guidance as to what may have been found to work in other countries, but they cannot prescribe. People know their own societies best. There is a plethora of evidence to show that prescriptions by external "experts" fail to take root and flourish. Rather, such interventions tend to be based on a relatively unsophisticated implanting of approaches taken from one country and applied to another. In the processes described above, there is a clear and effective role for such "experts", but as mentors, rather than as prescribers; as providers of ideas and concepts, not of solutions as such. Their role has to be contained to ensure that an internal dialogue takes place, and not an intrusive lecture by an external source on how other countries have approached similar problems, which may have little, if any, relevance to the challenges facing the country concerned.

Above all, the reforms must be sustainable. The system must be able to cope with and contain the pressures that are placed upon it by changes of government. This process is likely to be slow, often frustrating and never-ending, as there can be no "perfect solution". Fresh challenges to an integrity system will be made, as new ways are found of circumventing it. Reforms, too, will be needed, as comfortable oldassumptions are reappraised and found wanting. For example, in Britain, there has been controversy over whether it is appropriate for senior judges and senior policemen to be members of secret societies, the Masonic Lodges. This has yet to be resolved. Furthermore, in many developed countries thereare serious questions now being asked about the financing of political parties and about the activities of political lobbyists.

To achieve reform, a coalition has to be built around a consensus in supportof concerted action. It must draw in the various "stakeholders"from civil society no less than from the formal state apparatus, and it must gain their commitment to a concrete action plan. The agreed reform programme must move forward with a very clear vision of how the people would like to see their country governed, not just for the present or the immediate future, but for future generations.

This Source Book is designed to help these processes. It does not attempt to offer easy or off-the- shelf answers. Each country, each society, will need to fashion its own instruments of accountability, relevant and appropriate to their own settings and aspirations. It seeks to learn from experience and to capture information which may not otherwise be readily available. Above all, it is designed to provoke and promote informed discussion, as the process of rebuilding and refurbishing continues.

Lessons Learned - A Progress Report
[TI Source Book 2000 - Chapter 29]

Where the ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means, and these ... are technical, that is to say, capable of being settled by experts or machines like arguments between engineers and doctors [Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", Oxford lecture - 1958].

The past five years or so have witnessed an unprecedented attempt by governments and international agencies to combat corruption. These efforts began against a history of a determined refusal to accept that corruption was anything more than "a little local difficulty". East Asia aside, there was a dearth of experience in tackling the problem with any success, scant research had been undertaken and there had been little academic debate. Corruption was simply not taken seriously.

With the recent realisation of the extent and gravity of the problem has come widespread action. But looking back over the past five years or so, what have we learned? Where is the plethora of success stories? What has been seen to work, and what has been seen to fail?[1].

The list of suggested "lessons learned" given here is by no means exhaustive.[2] It lists some of the salient ones. Nothing is more certain than that we all have much more to learn:

1. None can claim moral superiority!
There was a time when Western Europeans in particular would regard themselves as being morally superior when it came to corruption. "They do things differently abroad," the argument ran. "We have to do things there we would not dream of doing at home".[3] They can no longer pretend to such moral superiority. The involvement of their exporters in systematic corruption throughout the world, and the degree to which their own political institutions have been corrupted through "black" money, have caused most of them to revise their views.

2. Everyone has to address the problem for themselves and in their own way!
Reform efforts have to be home-grown and locally-driven. They can be encouraged and fostered by outside partners (e.g. donors), but the drive and the leadership must come from within. Internal corruption must be dealt with from within, and corruption in international business transactions has to be dealt with from both sides of the equation. There is no "one size fits all" solution.

3. There are no "quick fixes"!
There is no such thing as a "quick fix". There may be areas in which quick wins can be gained - such as streamlining procedures in customs administration, opening up public procurement to make it more transparent, prosecuting a large number of corrupt officials or frying a few "bigfish" - but there is no over-all "quick fix". Combating corruption is a long and arduous process.

4. There is no place for exit strategies for donors!
Anti-corruption strategies do not have fixed time-frames. Where donors are involved they should not be looking for an early exit, but must be prepared for a sustained period of involvement.

5. A clear overall strategy and good public relations are needed!
A piecemeal approach to reforms is as reliable as a scattergun. The strategy must be all-embracing and should address all aspects of the national integrity system. Once a determined effort gets under way, public perceptions can be adversely affected by reports of Commissions of Inquiry or by seeing senior officials being prosecuted for serious offences. If the reform process is not accompanied by an appropriate public awareness and information programme, impressions can be formed that things are going from bad to even worse. It is crucial to pay special attention to public relations from the outset. Public expectations must be managed and the political risks contained.

6. Codes of ethics and "Citizens' Charters"!
These must not be used as decorations but used as agents of change. Codes of ethics are useful, but only where they are "bought into" by the staff in question. They must be involved in the drafting of them, and training programmes for all must be conducted. Training programmes need to be highly participatory and involve the discussion of hypothetical situations, and perhaps with some role playing. Mere lectures or hand-outs are ineffectual. Similarly, Citizen's Charters can have the effect of making highly visible commitments to the public, and constitute a challenge to a government agency to deliver what it promises. This means that the commitments in the Charters should be realistic. The Charters themselves must be publicised so as to reach the relevant members of the public.

7. Streamlining bureaucratic procedures!
Red tape should be cut, bureaucratic requirements reassessed and kept to a minimum. Staff in sensitive positions should be rotated and, in particularly vulnerable areas, contact between staff and the public depersonalised to reduce the chances of personal relationships developing. Customs, for example,is just one of several areas which lends itself to such a streamlining of procedures. Where personal contact is necessary, the introduction of elements of unpredictability as to which particular official may handle a matter or client reduces the potential for bribery. The introduction of computerisation can advance these processes while enhancing the monitoring of the speed with which goods are cleared, identifying delays and enabling the reasons for any delays to be investigated. However, in many countries the cumbersome bureaucracy has developed, not haphazardly, but precisely with the creation of bribe-taking opportunities in mind. These reforms may be self-evident but they are none-the-less difficult to achieve.

8. Whistleblowers must be encouraged and protected!
Aggrieved citizens, and "whistleblowers" inside the administration, can be encouraged to complain to new institutions such as anti-corruption commissions or Ombudsman offices, or through telephone "hot-lines". Unless they do, necessary actions will be delayed, perhaps indefinitely. Complainants must be assured that their complaints will be taken seriously, and that they themselves will not be placed at risk. In some countries, social taboos about "denouncing" fellow citizens have to be overcome. Raising public awareness in these matters is much talked about, but is left almost entirely to civil society to address.

9. Continuous monitoring is needed!
Experience shows that, for example, in police corruption, it is not enough to clean up a corruptforce. Unless processes are established for continuous monitoring, sooner or later a force will subside once more into a morass of corruption and require yet another extraordinary effort to try to rehabilitate it. It is not enough to remove corrupt officials without also removing opportunities and ensuring that honest officials are being appointed to positions of trust. "Integrity testing" can help ensure that honest officials are identified and considered for promotion.

10. Focus on "the system" not simply on "bad apples"!
To win public cooperation, a reform programme should focus on getting "the system" right rather than simply taking individuals out. In a situation of systemic corruption, the corrupt individual is not a single "bad apple" and removing him or her will not save the barrel - thewhole barrel needs to be addressed or else the person replacing the "bad apple" will be subjected to the same temptations. Prevention can be more effective and infinitely more economic than investigation and prosecution. At the end of the day, a government must have competent staff available and capable of discharging the affairs of state within a functioning institutional framework and subjected to an effective enforcement regime.

11. Escaping from the past--amnesties?
Escaping from a corrupt status quo is extremely difficult. Many powerful interests have reason to fear if a new dispensation is going to be unduly threatening to them. Amnesties are unpalatable, but may be unavoidable, at least in the context of small infractions by junior officials. Although the question of amnesties is problematic, there is much to be said for "letting sleeping dogs lie". Some senior staff may need to be removed or disciplined, but more junior staff other than those who have been seriously abusing positions of trust, should not feel that they are at risk. Until workable solutions can be developed, the question of the past will remain one of the largest single stumbling blocks to any reform.[4]

12. Leadership is vital but not enough--coalitions of interests can help!
Without leadership from the top, any attempt to achieve major reforms in an environment of systemic corruption will be bound to fail. Personal leadership is vital, and a leader must be seen to be "walking the talk", and not just mouthing platitudes.[5] However, just as laws alone will not suffice to achieve reform where corruption is systemic, so, too, is leadership not enough. Coalitions can be created to support leadership, but there is a danger where they embrace interests whose pasts are not "pure". Yet if only"saints" are admitted to a coalition there will probably be far too few. What is important is that coalition partners commit themselves to building a new future and, having made that commitment, that they be held to it.

13. Civil society has been overlooked...!
There appears to be a correlation between high levels of corruption and low levels of civil society activity. Efforts to assist the emergence of a creative and vibrant civil society call for the development of both a legal framework within which civil society can establish its institutions free of government interference and control, and for the building of a positive dialogue between civil society and governments. This is not always easy to achieve, particularly in an emerging democracy, as it may cut across preconceived notions of how government decisions should be developed and imposed. One way of testing the genuineness of a government's anti-corruption pledges is to see whether the government is prepared to work with civil society.

14. ... but NGOs themselves can be sources of corruption!
In a number of countries, NGOs have sprung up ad hoc, simply to tap into the assistance dollars which external donors have been prepared to provide to organisations for developmental efforts conducive to the strengthening of civil society. NGOs must be transparent and accountable in their own practices. NGOs, no less than official institutions, cannot be taken at face value and need to be monitored for transparency.

15. Legislatures--when the watchdog becomes the thief!
A serious flaw has emerged in a number of countries where the Legislature is not only a "watchdog" over official expenditure, but its Members are actively involved in spending public money (which they vote to themselves) and in letting public contracts (when they should be overseeing the process). This combination of "watchdog" role with that of the Executive gives rise to conflicts of interest and effectively poisons the body politic. It also breeds contempt for democratic institutions among the public at large. Unless these contradictions are resolved satisfactorily (e.g. by effecting a clear separation of powers) it is doubtful whether effective anti-corruption reforms can be achieved in those countries.

16. Political party funding remains a problem!
The issue of political party funding has been largely ignored by the international community, perhaps because political parties in most industrialised countries thrive on illicit funding. Some argue that the best way to restrict the influence of "money politics" is not so much to restrict money flowing in to a political party, but to restrict the amount of expenditures and what money can be spent on. The change of Taiwanese government in March, 2000, however, has shown that an affluent political party with large investments and powerful cronies can none the less be voted out of office. This encourages the belief that the manipulation of political party funding need not necessarily be an insuperable barrier to changes of government.

17. Independent agencies without security can be toothless!
The institutions of Ombudsman and of Auditor-General are attractive in theory but can only function effectively if their office-holders are protected from arbitrary removal by the very Executive they are required to be watching and reporting on. Constituencies outside the political processes have to be built to defend these office-holders and where necessary make their voices heard.

18. Access to information!
Some governments have recognised transparent access to information as the most effective tool for curbing corruption and have enacted appropriate legislation. Government agencies can be required to post details of the services they provide and the official charges for them. Indonesia is an example where local information displays with details of development projects have equipped the public with the information they need to keep a watchful eye on what is taking place.

19. Sound records management!
Public access to information requires sound records management. So, too, does holding individual public servants to account. A government agency should be charged with overseeing public sector document handling processes by individual departments and making provision for the archiving of spent documentation.

20. The media and whistleblowing journalists!
Most murders of journalists in recent years have been attributed to their investigating corruption cases and there is thus a need to render their work less risky as well as to raise standards of professionalism. Several institutions are running training courses in investigative journalism.However, in many parts of the world the media itself is blighted by corruption. The media is an "integrity pillar" which requires serious attention.

21. "Naming and shaming" seems attractive but doesn't seem to work!
Efforts to "name and shame" in the Kenyan Parliament drew a blank earlier in 2000 when a committee report which "named names" had all the names censored, and some of those "named" threatened to sue newspapers who published details - even though the information was already in the public domain. In India, the Vigilance Commissioner resorted to the Internet to post the names of hundreds of officials suspected of corruption. At best the jury is still out. The flamboyance with which the President of the Nigerian Senate, voted out of office in August, 2000, protested his innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence of malpractice, suggests that political leaders may have much thicker skins than do those who strategise to combat corruption. In any event, extreme care is needed to avoid any appearance of denying individuals a fair chance to defend themselves.

22. Is addressing inadequate salaries enough?
It stands to reason that inadequately paid public servants must be more vulnerable to temptation than those who are paid well. However, the depressing truth emerges that many of the most corrupt officials are in leadership positions which they have abused to amass large fortunes through "grand corruption". Salaries, then, are more a question for those in low positions,whose insistence on payments for services may be seen by their peers as a form of "userpays". Surveys suggest that people may be ready to pay for the services they receive, provided the fees are affordable and legal. What they bitterly resent is being subjected to extortion. One observer has noted that: "The evidence is at best unclear whether increasing public sector wages can reduce corruption. Yes, within a comprehensive package of civil service reform, proper compensation and incentives can play a role, but an in-depth look at country specificd ata does not support the notion that merely increasing official salaries to existing staff incorrupt agencies helps."[6]

23. But increasing pay may at least be a part of the answer...!
Real wages have declined in the public sector in many countries over substantial periods of time. In several cases this decline has been mirrored by declines in the efficiency of the public sector. One study shows that higher wage levels carries with them the chance to recruit better skilled people into government service, raising the quality of the services provided and, as described in the paper, the amount of tax collected. Simply raising tax rates may not raisea dditional state income; enhancing the skills of those involved in collecting it, can.[7]

24. Independent revenue authorities!
Independent revenue authorities can be established with closely monitored and well-paid staff, employed outside the public service salary structures. These authorities can boost the collection of revenue and enable a developing country to pay its officials and service the financial needs of its institutions more adequately.[8]

25. Do retirement benefits, especially for leaders, help?
Logic suggests that a lack of security in retirement is a factor in the corruption equation. However, when it comes to those in the most senior positions the anecdotal evidence to the contrary is depressing. In Zimbabwe, where controversial and excessively generous "retirement packages" were enacted for a large number of senior party figures, it seems to have had no impact whatsoever on the level of "grand corruption", which has, if anything, increased. Perhaps because members of the extended families, rather than the leaders personally, have been the beneficiaries, there has been no willingness to end the looting.

26. Do laws alone do the trick?
Certainly, laws alone do not offer a quick route to curb corruption, except perhaps where they are conferring on courts a jurisdiction they have not had before: to review the legality of administrative decisions taken by officials.[9] Repeatedly, Legislatures have passed new anti-corruption laws with great fanfare, and have regarded the job of reform (or at least the chimera of corruption reform) as a job completed. But laws are failing in every country where corruption is systemic, and they fail more from lack of enforcement than from any inadequacies in the laws themselves. There are also ways of achieving reforms, even in public procurement, without changing the law, but using contracts and civil penalties to ensure that standards of conduct improve.

27 ...where the Rule of Law is faltering...!
There is an inherent contradiction in trying to use a corrupt judicial system to uphold the Rule of Law. Institutional elements of the Judiciary, particularly appointment, removal and accountability aspects, have to be provided for. The Office of the Ombudsman may offer a way of introducing redress that can be quick and effective, and not be subject to the distortions that may hamstring a judiciary, but questions of judicial independence and judicial integrity have to be addressed from the outset.

28. But there still needs to be better laws!
That said, there still need to be laws that are workable. The burden of proof which is placed on a prosecutor should not be unnecessarily demanding. Affording an accused a fair trial does not mean making it impossible for a prosecutor to prove his or her guilt.[10] Laws of evidence need to be kept up-to-date and consideration given to introducing the specific offences which in Hong Kong were a key to the success of the anti-corruption initiative there.

29. Time limits for prosecutions need to be realistic!
"Grand corruption", especially, can be slow to be revealed, and prosecution cases can take along time to prepare thoroughly. For these reasons, time limitations for prosecutions to be brought, or for cases to be concluded, need to be realistic. In some countries it is virtually impossible to prosecute a case to its conclusion.

30. The "illicit enrichment" law!
One particular law which has proved to be effective in some countries is that of "illicit enrich-ment"which is effectively: the possession by a civil servant of inexplicable wealth. This law, coupled with a functioning legal and judicial system, spearheaded the Hong Kong reforms. However, some Legislatures have refused to enact such laws, ostensibly on the grounds that they may infringe human rights. In reality, however, refusals to enact such a law seem to stem from a desire to preserve the status quo.

31. Monitoring the assets of public officials!
There is widespread belief that this is potentially an effective tool for containing corruption, but the case to date has only been made on paper. Parliamentarians are remarkably shy when it comes to enacting laws to provide for the monitoring of the assets and incomes of senior officials. When laws are enacted, declarations are seldom required to be made public. They are, still less, routinely investigated for their accuracy. Initiatives in this area are being followed closely.

32. The scope of immunities and privileges reviewed
In many countries, immunities and privileges of senior public figures effectively shield them from the Rule of Law. Indeed, in some countries, criminals opt for elected office simply to gain immunity. These privileges and immunities need to be reassessed and their scope minimised to practical requirements. They are not granted to honour an individual, but to enable an individual to discharge his or her duties effectively.

33. The growing opportunities afforded by the Internet
The Internet can help build more open systems. Legislatures can establish web sites which enable citizens to interact with their elected representatives and serve to keep them informed of parliamentary business. Government departments can post their documentation. Reformers can advertise their national anti-corruption plans to the world at large, and monitor the progress being made very publicly. The Internet can be used for on-line public tendering, opening the information flow, and reducing opportunities for making potentially corrupt personal contacts. Of course, the usefulness of the web in this respect is limited by the number of people who may have access to it. Much of the Internet's potential is presently denied to many in the world's poorest countries, but growing numbers there do have access to the web, and any gains made by rendering their institutions and individuals more accountable should help to promote the interests of all.

34. Procurement is a battleground!
The field of public procurement has been a battleground for corruption fighters. It is in public procurement that most of the "grand corruption" occurs with much of the damage visibly inflicted upon the development process in poorer countries and countries in transition.Although initially there were sceptics who fought against the "Islands of Integrity" approach [presently called: "Integrity Pacts"], successes are increasingly being recognised. "Ingetrity Pact" is a process in which voluntary agreements are made, involving bidders and the government, to restrict opportunities for corruption in a particular project. The use being made of the Internet for public procurement by the city of Seoul and in Mexico is likewise promising.

35. The commissions bidders pay to agents should be declared...!
Some thought that legislation requiring disclosures of commissions would undermine international competitive bidding and that some corporations would not wish to abide by such a rule. However, where such a requirement has been introduced, there has been little evidence of it having such negative effect. The honest have nothing to hide, and if the corrupt fold their tents and leave, the field is better without their presence. The experience in New York City has been an inspiration to corruption fighters, and is being followed in Nigeria.

36. ... and corrupt bidders should be blacklisted!
Blacklisting firms caught bribing can be a potent weapon. Of course, this requires that due process be observed, and that penalties be proportionate. But there can be no doubt that the international corporations blacklisted by Singapore in the 1990's received a considerable shock, and that in the future others will think twice before attempting to bribe Singaporean officials. The World Bank subsequently went down the same path. It posts the names of black-listed firms and individuals on its web site. This remedy works best in countries where the Rule of Law is functioning properly and adequate appeal mechanisms are in place.

37. International problems require international solutions!
To the surprise of many Americans, a survey by TI in 1999 showed that the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, passed as long ago as 1977, is not having the effect that had been supposed. American companies exporting into key emerging markets were shown to be about as corrupt as German exporters, operating without any such deterrent and with the added advantage of tax deductions for the bribes they paid. It would seem that unilateral action by a single government, even of the world's most powerful nation, is insufficient to impact on a global problem. Rather the problem requires a coordinated international response. Hence, the need for international accords such as the OECD Convention Against the Bribing of Foreign PublicOfficials in International Business Transactions. The intentions of this Convention must be translated into reality.

38. International agreements require monitoring!
It is not enough to sign a Convention. The Convention must be put into effect. Where a Convention strikes at a country's successful export strategies, it is not altogether surprising that some exporting countries may be less than enthusiastic about the goals of the accord. On the other hand, those who support the aims of a Convention may regard some competitor countries with suspicion and need reassurance that they are not falling into a trap. Close evaluation and monitoring of implementation and enforcement, both by the governments involved and by civil society and the private sector, becomes a sine qua non.

39. Surveys can measure and identify successes and failures!
Reform programmes should be monitored for desired results. Monitoring requires effective measurement and is best done through surveys--and with the data being made public. Survey scan measure the impact of corruption on business, public perceptions, and, by targetingselected service providers, measure the levels of corruption in the services being provided. These surveys can be international, national or local, but their practical utility increases the closer they get to the grass roots. By comparing the results from agencies in differing parts ofthe country, the least efficient, and perhaps most corrupt, can be identified and steps taken to redress their performance. International surveys help raise the issue on the national agenda and keep it at the forefront of public debate. However, international surveys are comparative and fraught with statistical difficulties, and so are of limited usefulness. One of their most valuable aspects has been to raise the issue of corruption on the national political agenda, and to highlight the need for national surveys which are now being undertaken with an increasing thoroughness.

Final thoughts
The task of achieving sustainable anti-corruption reforms will be a long and arduous one. That the stakes are high is beyond dispute. Yet just how much time we have to make a significant impact on the phenomenon is uncertain.

On the one hand, it could be that the people in the most corrupt countries lose heart, lose faith in democratic practices and turn to authoritarianism, seemingly as a logical reaction to democracy's failure. There is, of course, no reason to suppose that a further round of autocracy will be any less disastrous than it has been in the past.

On the other hand, too, the international community may start to dilute their commitment to the cause. Other issues may attract their attention and may seem to offer more immediate responses to their interventions.

But one thing is clear: If we all - governments, civil society, the private sector and internationalorganisations - do not grasp the opportunities we now have to confront corruption effectively, then the chances will pass. Corruption will steadily and inexorably undermine the new democracies and will continue to impact negatively on human rights, the environment and all aspects of globalisation. The stakes, surely, could not be higher than they now are.